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The Constitution, Politics And
Professor Crosskey
By FLORAN BARTosic*
1. INTRODUCTION--"OuR UNKNowN CoNSTrTnoN"
No work on the Constitution since its ratification has resulted
in more comment and controversy than Professor William Wins-
low Crosskey's Politics and the Constitution. For some, our basic
constitutive legal document has at last found its true prophet,
while others have laughed Crosskey off as the "Don Quixote of
Chicago . . . the Knight of Hyde Park."' The great number of
reviews, analyses and appraisals, the sharp criticism and bitter
disagreement his work has evoked only underscore the importance
of the contribution he has made to the study of American constitu-
tional law. Indeed, the unrestrained acrimony of some attacks
and the effervescent fervor of several eulogies amply fulfill the
prophecy of Crosskeys colleague, Professor Max Rheinstein:
This book contains dynamite. It will be attacked, the truth
of its historical conclusions will be doubted by many, one
or other detail may perhaps be disproved, but neglected it
cannot be.2
If one were to accept as valid Professor Crosskey's method-
ological approach, arguments and conclusions, Charles Evans
Hughes' oft-quoted saying that "the Constitution is what the
judges say it is"3 would need to be modified. True, constitutional
law may be what the Nine Men have said it is, but the Constitu-
tion-the true, unknown Constitution-is anything but what they
have said it is. Nor have the historians, the political scientists
A.B., 1948, Pontifical College Josephinum; B.C.L., 1956, College of William
& Mary; LL.M., 1957, Yale University. Associate Professor of Law Villanova Uni-
versity. On leave, as Executive Assistant to court-appointed Board of Moniters of
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Admitted to bar, Virginia.
1 Hart, "Professor Crosskey and Judicial Review," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1456,
1456-1457 (1954).2 Rheinstein, "Crosskey on Politics and the Constitution'" U. of Chi. Law
School Record, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 16 (1954).
3 Quoted in 1 Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes 204 (1951).
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and the academic branch of the legal profession done much better
than the Supreme Court in their efforts to arrive at the intended
meaning of our nation's governmental blueprint. It is for this
reason that Professor Crosskey has devoted two volumes (and
promises additional ones) to reporting the results of his research
into the origins and character of the government of the United
States and into the many political and philological vicissitudes
which, according to him, have beclouded the historic and in-
tended meaning of the provisions of our Constitution. He makes
his report with courage and with what amounts to almost religious
fervor.
The very first principle of orthodox constitutional law is re-
jected by Crosskey: The Founding Fathers did not intend to
create a national government of limited, enumerated powers; on
the contrary, their intent was to establish a government endowed
with plenary power to attain all the objectives recited in the
preamble. Congress was meant to have general legislative au-
thority to pass all laws necessary and proper for the general wel-
fare and the common defense. The President was to possess gen-
eral executive power to insure domestic tranquillity. The Supreme
Court was constituted the juridical head of a unified national sys-
tem of administering justice-in all judicial matters it was to be
supreme over state as well as federal courts. The states were to
have a limited and subordinate governmental role, at least as far
as the formal and effective power processes were concerned. One
heretical proposition after another is propounded by Crosskey:
Congress was to have authority to regulate intra-state commerce;
most of the Bill of Rights was intended to apply to the states as
well as the federal government; the Supreme Court was not
granted a general power of judicial review to declare acts of Con-
gress unconstitutional. And the accepted interpretations of other
constitutional provisions are challenged and new explanations ad-
vanced.
It is the purpose of this article to consider critically the
methodology employed by Professor Crosskey in his study and
to present in survey fashion the Constitution, as he has rediscov-
ered it. His supporters and critics-constructive and destructive
-will be heard, and an appraisal of the significance of his work
will be attempted.
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II. Tim MAN, His WoRx AND His METHODOLOGY
There have really been very few scholarly works on constitu-
tional law that could properly be termed "must reading" for the
practitioner. But regardless of the ultimate judgment that only
patient, calm, impartial historial scholarship can pass on Politics
and the Constitution, it is a work that the practicing constitutional
lawyer may not ignore, for it is a basic, fundamental study-it
goes for the jugular on all controversial constitutional issues. One
is not surprised, then, to learn that although William Crosskey
has been a professor at the University of Chicago Law School for
the past twenty years, as a young man he received over seven
years of that rigorous training which only the stern school of New
York corporate practice can provide.
Born in 1894, Crosskey did his undergraduate studies at Yale
College and took his law degree at the Yale Law School. After
a year's clerkship with Chief Justice Taft, he joined a Broad Street
law firm. There, together with his colleagues, he was constantly
puzzled over the then current constitutional exegesis espoused by
the Nine Old Men. Nor for that matter was the New Deal Court's
approach to satisfy him either. By this time he had become a law
teacher, and he decided to make his own independent investiga-
tions. In 1937 he began his research in connection with a law
review article on the commerce clause; the conclusions he reached
were not in accord with conventional doctrine, but they were
reasonable ones, supported by documentary evidence. To test
his theories further, he undertook an intensive research project:
he traveled throughout the country, visited libraries, great and
small, investigated forgotten files, private papers and correspond-
ences; he even went to cemeteries and read tombstones. As his
research progressed, Crosskey became more and more convinced
that the traditional interpretations of the Constitution were at
least questionable. Politics and the Constitution represents the
initial statement of his final conclusions which are presented by
him as expressing the true meaning of our national constitutive
governmental document.
Professor Crosskey seems to ground his entire methodological
approach upon the well-known Holmesian canon of construction:
We ask, not what this man meant, but what these words
[Vol. 46,
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would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English,
using them in the circumstances in which they were used.4
The interpretation of the Constitution, then, resolves itself into
answering this question: what did the Constitution mean to an
intelligent, well-informed person at the time it was drafted? As
the foundation for his reply Crosskey has sought to recreate "the
same apperceptive mass of factual knowledge possessed by an
intelligent and well-informed mind of 1787"5 and to recreate also
the legal and political ideas then prevalent. He attaches special
importance to an understanding of eighteenth century modes of
documentary interpretation and rules and practices of legal draft-
manship. Equally important is his attempt to provide a special-
ized dictionary of eighteenth century word usages. After what
seems to have been a thorough, if not exhaustive, philological
survey of the era's newspapers, letters, pamphlets and public
documents, Crosskey compiled his lexicon, and he assures us that
in doing this he has relied upon "only materials that are beyond
suspicion."" His specialized lexicon of word-usages and juristic
and political ideas thus furnishes an effective instrument with
which to rediscover the circumstances in which the Constitution
was written-the language, the law, the economics and politics of
the time-all for the purpose of attaining a true understanding
of the Constitution, and to that ultimate end, an understanding
of the literature of 1787 and 1788 about it. Professor Crosskey's
contentions are that his methodology is a valid one, that his re-
search tools and procedures are reliable, and that his conclusions
are established by them.
As supporting evidence, Crosskey points to the inherent con-
sistency and coherence of his entire unitary theory of constitu-
tional interpretation. He also asks us to consider some of the evil
consequences of the long-standing and current misconceptions of
the scheme of power, legislative and judicial, which the Constitu-
tion established between the Nation and the states: (1) our
failure to obtain uniform law throughout the country, in many
fields, especially commercial; (2) the increasing complexity of
our corporation laws; (8) the complicated chaos which prevails
4 Holmes, "The Theory of Legal Interpretation," 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417 (1899).
5 1 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution 12 (1958) (hereinafter cited as
Crosskey).0 Id. at 5.
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when our state laws come in contact; (4) the ever-growing maze
of tax barriers to trade between the states, and (5) the needless
differences resulting from the "common law" of our forty-eight
states. According to Crosskey, the Constitution provided remedial
action for all these very pressing and complicated problems, and
still does, if only the distortions and misunderstandings that have
accumulated over the years can be sloughed off and pristine con-
stitutional purity restored. Hence, in addition to being able to
put forward his theory of constitutional exegesis as a scientifically
tested and proven one inasmuch as it renders the widest array of
facts comprehensible as parts of a consistent whole, Crosskey can
also make the telling point that, if adopted, his theory would
ameliorate many of the evils and obviate many of the difficulties
in our present system of law and government.
According to Crosskey, the men who have served as members
of our highest court, with the possible exception of John Marshall
Harlan, the elder-his one fall from grace was his ardent advocacy
of substantive due process-have misunderstood the essential
nature of our governmental structure. "[T]he Justices, over the
years since 1789, have generally done things they ought not to
have done, and, quite as generally, left undone things they ought
to have done; and, further to pursue the language of the Book of
Common Prayer, it does truly seem that, in their discharge of
this important function [the guardianship of the Constitution],
there has been no health in them."7 But if he be right, how ac-
count for the fact that not only the Supreme Court but also legal
and historical scholars have misunderstood so many basic pro-
visions of the Constitution?
Some of the present misconceptions are products of deliberate,
wilful distortions to facilitate the accomplishment of desired po-
litical ends. There have been at times weak yieldings to pressure
to adopt particular interpretations of the Constitution, whether
warranted by its words or not. The "states' rights" politicians,
especially those from the slave states, were major participants in
effectuating the changed meanings-they wrung anti-national con-
cessions from the Federalists. The Great Chief Justice was not a
bold innovator. He and Story were, of course, nationalists, but it
was not a case of their broadening originally narrow federal
7 2 Crosskey 1161.
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powers; rather they fought rear-guard actions, salvaging what
they could before the Jeffersonian onslaught. Then, too, Congress
failed to exercise many of its rightful powers during the early
years of our Nation's history, and a paucity of precedents resulted
from the geographic inaccessibility of the Supreme Court. But
the most important, though least suspected, factors that have con-
tributed to constitutional misunderstandings have been fortuitous
elements of the highest potency-changes in basic legal, economic
and political ideas and radical changes in the usage of key words.
Further, traditional historians have mistakenly relied upon James
Madison as the "Father of the Constitution," and they have failed
to grasp the true nature of the "Federalist Papers." Crosskey con-
siders Madison to be a highly unreliable witness; The Federalist
was campaign propaganda designed to facilitate the adoption of
the Constitution in an anti-federalist stronghold by allaying the
fears of the doubting; and it contains sophistries, inconsistencies,
distractions, tricks, and some things which come perilously close
to falsehood.
Standing by themselves, these causal influences of erroneous
constitutional interpretation may seem inadequate, but when
buttressed by Crosskey's detailed historic-philological documenta-
tion, his reasoning is at the very least not implausible. Once ac-
complished, heterodoxy became orthodoxy, and error was com-
pounded upon error.
To sum up, here is the way Professor Crosskey describes the
objective of his work and his methodology:
It will propound a unitary theory of the Constitution based,
in part, upon the antecedent usage of the words in which
the document is cast, and based, for the rest, upon certain
legal and political ideas of the period in which the Constitu-
tion was written. It will then test this theory, and the dic-
tionary of terms, and the legal and political ideas, upon
which it is based, by the fit of all these with a long parade
of events and ideas, some antecedent, some subsequent, to
the Constitution as an historical event.8
But before Crosskey's work can be evaluated with fairness,
it is necessary to delineate in more detail his revolutionary unitary
theory of constitutional exegesis. Of course, the most we can
8 1 Crosskey 13-14.
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hope to do is to sketch some of the evidence he presents in sup-
port of his position, for his arguments are numerous, detailed and
rather difficult to summarize.
III. THE CONSTITTIONAL WOMLD OF PROFESSOR CROSSICEY9
A. The National Power Over Commerce
Professor Crosskey began his initial research twenty years ago
by examining the most important of Congress' non-military
powers-its authority over commerce. This is the first subject to
which he turns his attention in Politics and the Constitution.
When it seemed that the Nine Old Men intended to adhere
resolutely to their restrictive interpretations of the commerce
power, historical and legal scholars took up the challenge and
endeavored to find new meanings for the commerce clause.
Stem's suggestion was that "among" meant "concern more than
one of" the states; hence Congress might regulate that intra-state
commerce which "concerned" more states than one.'10 Then in
1937 Hamilton and Adair reached the conclusion that "commerce"
in 1787 was the "name for the economic order" and the "one word
which could catch up into a single comprehensive term all activi-
ties directly affecting the wealth of the nation."1 Professor Cross-
key follows this approach and contends that "commerce" in its
eighteenth century constitutional context signified "all gainful
activity," including agriculture, banking, manufacturing and in-
surance, as well as trade and transportation. To support this in-
terpretation of "commerce" as co-extensive with business and eco-
-nomics, numerous examples of usages of the term with that precise
connotation are cited: the writings of Adam Smith, Blackstone,
Alexander Hamilton, and James Wilson (delegate to the Con-
stitutional Convention and one of the original Supreme Court
Justices).
9See Krash, "A More Perfect Union: The Constitutional World of William
Wrinslow Crosskey," 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1953).
10 Stern, "That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One," 47 Harv.
L. Rev. 1335 (1934).
3.1 Hamilton and Adair, The Power to Govern 62-63 (1937). A similar
argument was presented to the Supreme Court in briefs for the United States in
-the Wage and Hour Act and anti-trust insurance cases. See United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), Government's Brief, pp. 50-54 and United States v.




But this is only the beginning. Not only did "commerce" mean
"all gainful activity"; "state" was used to mean "the people col-
lectively in a community," not merely a "territory," and "among'
did not connote "movement between" states, but "within" the
states themselves. Hence, the commerce clause, when and as it
was written, was understood to be a "simple and exhaustive cata-
logue of all the different kinds of commerce to which the people
of the United States had access: commerce, that is, with the
people of foreign nations, commerce with the people of the Indian
tribes, and commerce with the people of the several states." 2 In
short, Congress was intended to have the authority to regulate
"intra-state," as well as "inter-state" and foreign commerce.
In support of his position that "state" in 1787 was most com-
monly used in the sense of the "people of a state"-this is today
still a legitimate, if not a common usage-Crosskey marshalls
many examples of such usage from the newspapers, correspond-
ence and treatises of that period. For example, plural verbs were
used with the singular subject "state": "the state of Virginia are
involved to an amount almost incredible in debts to the British
merchants, which were not cancelled according to their hopes by
the treaty of peace."' 3 Further, the word "States" in the com-
merce clause comes between the two nouns "Nations" and
"Tribes," both of which were often understood in 1787, and still
are today, in a multitudinal sense. Besides, any interpretation
but Crosskey's would result in an unidiomatic meaning for
"among," which is usually employed to denote not movement
from or to another of a group of places, but movement from one
to another of a group of persons. Finally, the societal sense of
the word "state" is underscored by eighteenth century political
philosophy, according to which, men initially in a state of nature
formed themselves into civil societies, into "states."
Three chapters are devoted to an analysis of the phrase "to
regulate commerce." To prove that it was understood in an inclu-
sive sense during the pre-Federal Convention period Crosskey
assembles and examines in detail three principal items of evi-
dence: (1) the 1767 Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, pub-
lished by John Dickinson, a Revolutionary pamphleteer and
12 1 Crosskey 77.
18 Id. at 61. See also 1 Crosskey 60-65.
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later a member of both the Continental Congress and the Federal
Convention; 4 (2) the papers of James Duane, a New York dele-
gate to the First Continental Congress, which treat of the con-
gressional proceedings concerning the adoption of the 1774
Resolutions on the Rights and Grievances of the Colonies; 1r and
(8) newspaper discussions of 1777-1780 concerning wage and
price control. 6 Evidence advanced to establish that the phrase
was understood in the same sense at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution and during the formative period of our govern-
ment includes, in addition to a brief treatment of the ratification
campaign:' 7 (1) the discussions of 1791 concerning the bill to
establish the Bank of the United States; 8 (2) the 1817 and 1828
debates on internal improvements; 9 and (8) the famous con-
troversy over the New York steamboat monopoly.20
But what about Chief Justice Marshall's Gibbons v. Ogden
opinion of 1824,21 which has been traditionally interpreted as re-
stricting Congressional power to the sphere of "inter-state com-
merce? Marshall himself, of course, did not use the word, and
Crosskey claims that if Gibbons v. Ogden is read carefully, it does
not support the conventional interpretation. He is also quick to
observe that the Great Chief Justice in his 1821 Cohens v. Virginia
opinion 22 had declared:
That the United States form, for many, and for most im-
portant purposes, a single nation, has not yet been denied
* . . In all commercial regulations, we are one and the same
people. In many other respects, the American people are
one; and the government which is alone capable of con-
trolling and managing these interests, is the government
of the Union. It is their government, and in that character
they have no other. America has chosen to be in many
respects, and to many purposes, a nation; and for all these
purposes, our government is complete; to all these objects,
14 See Chapter V, pp. 115-136.
15 See Chapter VI, pp. 137-172.
16 See Chapter VII, pp. 173-186.
17 See Chapter VIII, pp. 187-192.
18 See Chapter VIII, pp. 192-228.
19 See Chapter IX, pp. 229-292.
20Ibid. See also Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812); Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824); and Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713
(N.Y. 1825).
219 Wheat. 1 (1824).
22 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).
[Vol. 46,
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it is competent. The people have declared, that in the exer-
cise of all powers given for these objects it is supreme.23
(Emphasis added)
Crosskey suggests that Marshall in retreating to some extent in
the Gibbons case from his earlier views was "merely making a
compelled concession . . . to prevent dissents by certain of his
'States' Rights' brethren and keep the writing of the Court's
opinion in his own hands, where, he doubtless considered, with
very good reason, it was much more safe."24
As a final piece of evidence, Professor Crosskey points out
rather tellingly that less than a year after Gibbons v. Ogden was
decided Chief Justice Savage of New York in one of his opinions
explained by way of dictum that in 1789:
It was not... thought, that state boundaries had any effect
or influence upon this kind of navigation [the coasting trade
-voyages between ports of the same state, as well as those
between ports of different states]. It was not then thought
that the coasting trade, or commerce among the states, must
consist of voyages from state to state only: that was the
discovery of later times. [But] it was then thought that com-
merce among the states meant among the people of the
states.21
B. The Interrelationships between the Commerce Clause and
the Imports and Exports, Ex-Post-Facto, and Contracts
Clauses of Article I, Section 10
One of Crosskey's contentions is that the true meaning of the
Commerce Clause has been in large part obscured by misinterpre-
tations of three constitutional provisions which limit the power
of the states: (1) the Imports and Exports Clause; (2) the Ex-
post-facto Clause, and (8) the Impairment of Contracts Clause.
(1) Traditionally, the Imports and Exports Clause has been
interpreted as forbidding the states to levy certain taxes upon
goods imported from or exported to foreign countries. But by
means of his historico-philological methodology Crosskey demon-
strates that in the late eighteenth century the words "imports"
and "exports" were used not only to designate goods brought
23 Id. at 413-414.
24 1 Crosskey 256.25 North River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 1 Hopk. 149 (N.Y. Ch. 1824).
See 1 Crosskey 278 and in general 268-280.
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from or destined for foreign countries, but also to refer to the
movement of goods from one state to another state. Further, the
clause prohibits the levying of "duties," which, according to
Crosskey, meant all taxes, even retail excises, with the exception
of only general property taxes. Therefore, he concludes that this
clause was written to proscribe nearly all state taxation of inter-
state, as well as foreign, imports and exports. 0
Should Crosskey's exegesis of the Imports and Exports Clause
be accepted, the maze of confusion resulting from the Supreme
Court's casuistic treatment of state taxation of interstate com-
merce could be cleared away. The taxable event, multiple burden
and substantial effects tests and the various modifications thereof
could be discarded, and the Court could strike down state at-
tempts to tax interstate commerce on the authority of the Imports-
Exports Clause.
(2) Ever since Calder v. Bull2 7 the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Ex-post facto Clause as prohibiting only retroactive
criminal legislation. Crosskey marshalls respectable evidence to
prove that it was originally intended to forbid all retroactive laws,
civil and criminal. 8 Why the distortion? To pave the way for
federal bankruptcy relief to those who were burdened with pre-
existing debts. It is not insignificant that among those who needed
this relief badly were Robert Morris, "the financier" of the Revo-
lution, an important member of the Federal Convention and a
former United States Senator, who was confined in a debtor's
prison when Calder v. Bull was decided, and James Wilson, signer
of the Declaration of Independence, member of the Federal Con-
vention, chief preliminary draftsman of the Constitution, who
was an associate justice of the Supreme Court when Calder v.
Bull was decided, but who could not sit with his brothers on the
case in Philadelphia because had he appeared there, he would
have been imprisoned for his debts.
(3) If the foregoing analysis of the Ex-post-facto Clause be
correct, the Impairment of Contracts Clause, as traditionally in-
terpreted, is rendered superflous. Crosskey's thesis is that the lat-
ter provision was intended to forbid the impairment of the obliga-
2 6 See 1 Crosskey 295-323.
273 DalI. 386 (1798).
2 8 See 1 Crosskey 824-351.
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tion of future contracts as well as those already executed; it was
meant to proscribe all state laws which would lessen the number
of enforceable contracts, whether the contracts were previously
formed or not.29 For example, if before the ratification of the
Constitution a state did not have a Statute of Frauds, the enact-
ment of such a law would be unconstitutional, but if a Statute of
Frauds was in force in a state when the Constitution was ratified,
it could be repealed since such action would increase the totality
of enforceable contracts.
Professor Crosskey claims that the interdependence in mean-
ing of the Ex-post-facto and Contracts Clauses and their logical
correlation with the Commerce Clause furnish oblique internal
evidence of a most cogent kind that his view of a plenary national
commerce power is correct.
C. A Unitary View of the National Governing Powers
The basic principle of Professor Crosskey's theory is that the
Constitution of the Founding Fathers intended Congress to be
endowed with general legislative power to enact all laws neces-
sary and proper for the general welfare and the common defense,
and that of the three branches of the federal government, Con-
gress was meant to be supreme.
What are the sources of this general legislative authority? To
begin with, Crosskey claims that regardless of the modern notion
of a preamble as a "verbal flourish" or a "ritualistic rigmarole,"
in the eighteenth century it constituted a formal declaration of
legislative intent to guide executive and juducial officers in their
duties of administration. Indeed, the works of Viner, Rutherford
and Blackstone show that the normal eighteenth century canons
of statutory interpretation permitted a court to depart from the
letter of a law, if its spirit, as expressed in its preamble, so re-
quired. Crosskey is of the view that our constitutional preamble
vested Congress with general powers to obtain the general gov-
ernmental objectives recited therein. 0 Another source of Con-
gressional general legislative power, according to Crosskey, is the
first clause of Article 1, Section 8, which provides:
The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imports and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the general Welfare of the United States ....
29 Id. at 352-360.
so Id. at 363-384.
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He interprets the "General Welfare" provision not as a limitation
upon the taxing power, but as a grant of one of three separate sub-
stantive powers: (1) the power to tax, (2) the power to pay the
debts, and (8) the power to provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the Nation.31 A final source of general legisla-
tive power is found in the fact that an eighteenth century legisla-
ture was regarded as possessing power to enact "rules of de-
cisions," that is, the power to require judges to decide all non-
constitutional questions in a specific manner. Since, as we shall
see, Crosskey contends that state courts were to be subordinate
to the federal judiciary in all matters and that there was in 1789
no separate state "common laws," but only a general, nation-wide
common law, the authority of Congress, he concludes, was meant
to be commensurate with the fullness of the common law.32
But how explain the presence of enumerated federal powers
in the Constitution? As the basis for his answer, Crosskey relies
upon an acute, penetrating analysis of Blackstone's chapters on
the "Royal Prerogative." Nineteen of the twenty-nine enumera-
tions are accounted for on the theory that prior to the American
Constitution these powers were regarded as properly belonging
to the executive branch of government; they were specifically
enumerated as the functions of Congress because the Founding
Fathers desired to transfer them to the legislative branch. Having
formerly been the prerogative of the king, they would have
naturally belonged to the President, had not the Constitution
specifically spelled them out as being the powers of Congress. 3
It is conceded that some clauses of Article I, Section 8 were
enumerated to impose limitations on Congress; for example, the
grant of power to establish "a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" was meant to
obviate even the possibility of non-uniform legislation in those
fields.' 4 Other powers, Crosskey maintains, were enumerated for
the sake of emphasis and clarification.3 5
As for the Tenth Amendment, it, too, has been misinterpreted.
The word "delegated" was used in the common eighteenth cen-
31 Id. at 393-401.
32 Id. at 557-562.
33 Id. at 409-467.
34 Id. at 468-493.
35 Id. at 468-486 and 493-508.
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tury meaning of "absolutely parted with" or "vested exclusively
in"; "reserved" was employed not in the sense of "retained," but
in the then common technical legal sense of the creation of a new
interest which had never previously existed as such; and the
phrase "or to the people" was used in apposition to the word
"states" to signify the same persons, namely, the people of the
United States."' A modernized version of Crosskey's Tenth
Amendment would read:
The powers not vested exclusively in the United States by
the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the state govern-
ments are reserved to the people of the states.37
To support his philological interpretation, Crosskey adduces, in
addition to the usages in Blackstone's Commentaries and the
Gazette of the United States, the views of the great commentator
on American law, Chief Justice James Kent of New York, and the
concurrent views of three United States Supreme Court Jus-
tices, Henry Brockholst Livingston, Smith Thompson and Joseph
Story.38 Further, he points out that the insertion of the word
"expressly"-its eighteenth century meaning was "unambigously
and in full detail"-was three times voted down in Congress .3
Professor Crosskey also has a new interpretation for the Full
Faith and Credit Clause: it was intended to make possible a
national system of inter-state conflict of law rules. According to
his specialized eighteenth century lexicon, "public acts" meant
statutes of state legislatures, "judicial proceedings" meant judg-
ments and decrees of courts, and "records" meant judicial pre-
cedents.40 Modernized, his version of the clause would read:
Such effect shall be given in each state to the legislation,
judicial precedents and court judgments and decrees of
every other state, as will answer, in every respect to what
is required by the rules and principles of the conflict of
laws.4 1
And with respect to the "Time, Places and Manner of holding
31 Id. at 675-690 and 697-708. See supra, pp. 11-12.
37 Krash, "A More Perfect Union," 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1953). See
the opinion of Chief Justice Kent in Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 573-
575 (N.Y. 1812).
38 See 1 Crosskey 690-697.
39 Id. at 680-684.
40 Id. at 541-557.
41 Krash, op. cit. Supra note 36, at 15.
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Elections" Clause, Crosskey contends that "manner" was used in
1787 to refer to the qualifications or the identity of voters-the
determination of the "manner" of voting was the decision as to
"who should vote." Hence, if it chose to do so, Congress could
enact national uniform legislation concerning the qualifications
for participation in Congressional elections.42
At this point it might be well to emphasize that in the Cross-
key scheme for the distribution of governmental authority, state
powers are not eliminated, but merely subordinated to those of
the Nation, except for those cases of certain exclusive federal
powers and certain specific prohibitions against the states.
D. The Supreme Court's Intended Place in the Constitutional
System.
Crosskey's concept of the constitutional system for the ad-
ministration of justice is anything but orthodox. His disagreement
with accepted notions can be expressed in two theses:
1. The United States Supreme Court was intended to be
the head of a unified national judicial system; and
2. The Court was not to be endowed with a general power
of judicial review.
1. One of Crosskey's key theses is that at the time of the
ratification of the Constitution there was a national common
law.43 The whole theory of each state having its own common
law was nothing more than a tenet of "the party line" of Jeffer-
sonism around 1800, but the Supreme Court unfortunately ac-
cepted this false premise and thus not only, as we have seen,
foreclosed completely any true understanding of the enumera-
tion of Congressional powers and obscured the scope of Congress'
judicial-rule-making power, but also helped to destroy its own
general judicial supremacy. As might be expected, our author
has little sympathy with the Erie-Tompkins doctrine, which limits
the Supreme Court's supremacy to federal questions and requires
it to follow the state courts with respect to state statutory and
42 See 1 Crosskey 522-530. Crosskey also contends that the Constitution
grants to Congress the "ultimate power over voters' qualifications in state elections
of the more popular branches of the several state legislatures" (id. at 533) and
the power "to see that the right of the people to appoint Presidential electors is
everywhere preserved inviolate and really effective" (id. at 539). See 1 Crosskey
531-541.
43 Id. at 578-609.
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common law.44 Crosskey attacks this position on pragmatic and
historical grounds; he impliedly claims that the Court in over-
ruling Swift v. Tyson was misled by the well-known historical
study of Charles Warren;45 and he expressly states that "it would
seem unquestionable that acceptance of ... [the Erie] dogma
has, by all odds, been the most fundamental and far-reaching
error the Supreme Court has ever made."4 Justice Story made no
rash advance in the Swift case; instead his opinion was a cautious
effort to save what he could of the plenary jurisdiction of the
federal judiciary.
Originally, there was no intention to have two independent
judicial structures-federal and state-without a common head,
much less to have the national court system subordinated to the
state judiciaries with respect to all questions of law. Suppose,
for example, that a case arose in a federal court based upon
diversity of citizenship and that the questions at issue involved
the interpretation of the Constitution, a treaty, a federal statute,
a state statute and the common law. If the case eventually came
before the Supreme Court, it would be the final arbiter of all the
legal issues raised, and thereafter all state courts would be obliged
to follow the Supreme Court's resolution of not only the federal,
but also the state questions of law. In short, if Crosskey's views
should ever be accepted by the Supreme Court, there would be a
national uniform common law, state laws would be construed
identically in all courts, and the Supreme Court would have the
final say on all questions of law.
The evidence advanced in support of this position includes
the following:
(a) In the 1805 diversity case of Huidekoper's Lessee v.
Douglass47 the Supreme Court rejected the construc-
tion of a state statute concerning title to realty pre-
viously adopted by the highest court of the state and
44See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64 (1938); West v. American
T. & T. Co. 311 U.S. 223 (1940) and Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S.
169 (1940). See also Clark, Professor Crosskey and the Brooding Omnipresence
of Erie-Tompkins, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 24 (1953).4 5 Warren, "New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,"
37 Harv. L. Rev. 49 (1928). See 1 Crosskey 627-628, note, and 2 Crosskey 916-
934, 1170-1171.
46 2 Crosskey 1169.
473 Cranch 1 (1805). See 2 Crosskey 719-753.
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substituted its own; subsequently the Supreme Court's
interpretation was followed.
(b) Anti-federalist contrivances of the Jeffersonians led to
the 1812 Supreme Court holding in United States v.
Hudson and Goodwin48 that there is no federal com-
mon law of crimes.
(c) In the early years of our Nation's history the federal
courts did not follow state law in equity cases: they
enforced certain substantive equitable rights that were
not recognized by state tribunals and denied enforce-
ment of others that were established by state law.49
2. But if Crosskey would expand the jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court in one direction, he would limit it in another. While
stressing that the Court was intended to have the power to declare
null and void all state statutes which conflict with the Constitu-
tion, he contends that the Constitution does not confer upon it
similar authority with respect to federal legislation, except that
which might infringe upon the judiciary's constitutional bailiwick
-the administration of justice in accordance with Article III and
pertinent sections of the Bill of Rights.50 For example, if Con-
gress should pass a law that abridges the right of the people
peaceably to assemble the Court could not declare it unconstitu-
tional, but Congressional enactment abolishing trial by jury could
and should be struck down. Each branch of the federal govern-
ment was to decide the limits of its own sphere of constitutional
authority, and the people, not the courts, were to be the ultimate
judges at the polls.
After carefully examining and analyzing all alleged cases of
pre-Constitutional judicial review, Crosskey concludes that there
was not one instance of an open or effective reversal of a legisla-
tive act by a court other than where the act involved the authority
of the court. 1 Further, he considers, but rejects the arguments
based upon constitutional provisions which have been tradition-
ally relied upon as logically sufficient to justify the power of the
Supreme Court to invalidate acts of Congress. There is nothing
in the Constitution itself to support the theory of general judicial
48 7 Cranch 32 (1812). See 2 Crosskey 766-784.
49 See 2 Crosskey 865-902.
50 Id. at 1002-1007.
51 Id. at 938-975.
52 Id. at 982-1002.
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review. On the contrary, negative arguments grounded upon the
Constitution can be adduced against it. Crosskey, for example,
finds it strange that the very governmental agencies to be super-
vised-the executive branch and Congress-are presented with
the means of circumventing judicial review in the form of their
court "packing" powers.53 Then, too, if judicial review be con-
sidered as an instrumentality intended for the protection of states'
rights against the federal government, why was provision not
made for advisory opinions, for the states and Congress to be
parties in cases where a federal statute is challenged as uncon-
stitutional, and for the expeditious handling of such litigation?' 4
All of this, of course, neatly dovetails with Crosskey's unitary
view of the national governing powers, for if Congress was in-
tended to possess not limited, but general legislative authority,
there would not be too many states' rights to be protected.
E. The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Limitations on
State Governmental Authority.
Professor Crosskey contends that the Bill of Rights, with the
exception of the First Amendment, in which Congress is specific-
ally named, and the appeals clause of the Seventh Amendment,
restricted by its terms to the federal courts, was intended to im-
pose limitations upon the states as well as the national govern-
ment.
To begin with, the amendments under consideration are writ-
ten literally in general terms-nothing in their language exempts
the states from the governmental disabilities created-and this
stands out in contrast with the two instances of guarantees drawn
to apply to the federal government only. Eighteenth century
rules of draftmanship would have required explicit limitation to
minimize the full scope imported by the general words usedY5
Then, too, the governmental action proscribed by the Bill of
Rights is "inherently evil"; therefore it is "utterly impossible" to
suppose that the First Congress intended the states to have the
power to do the things forbidden. 6 This general interpretation
is also in keeping with the high purposes of the Preamble. More-
53 Id. at 981-982.
54 Id. at 976-981.
55 Id. at 1059-1060, 1064.56 Id. at 1059.
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over, after analyzing the complex Senate proceedings relative to
the amendments, Crosskey concludes that they were intended to
be general and to apply to the states, although he does concede
that, as originally proposed by Madison, the Bill of Rights was
meant to constitute restrictions upon only the national govern-
ment.57  Finally, he maintains that Supreme Court Associate
Justice William Johnson in 1819 and in 1820, the Supreme Court
of New York in 1820, and then the well-known law writers, Wil-
liam Rawle and Joseph Angell, in 1828 and 1829, "were of the
opinion, before the Supreme Court's decision of Barron v. Balti-
more had been handed down [in 1883] that all such parts of the
first eight amendments did apply, in accordance with their plain
letter, to all governmental action, whether by the nation or by the
separate states."58
How does Crosskey account for the erroneous opinion of
Chief Justice Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore59 to the effect that
the first eight amendments do not apply to the states? Surely
Marshall and concurring Justice Story knew better. In fact,
"bearing in mind the ability of the two men concerned, the only
tenable conclusion is that Marshall and Story knew full well that
the Court's decision in Barron v. Baltimore was quite unjustified;
that it was, in fact, just one more of the Court's many regrettable
surrenders to the steady onslaughts of 'States Rights."' 0
Professor Crosskey seems to consider the "true meaning" of
the Fourteenth Amendment to be "very simple and very obvi-
ous."6 ' The Privileges and Immunities Clause was to overrule
not only the Dred Scott decision, but also Barron v. Baltimore
and make the Bill of Rights a restriction upon the states, as
originally intended.62 The Due Process Clause was intended to
protect only procedural, not substantive rights. 3 The Equal Pro-
tection Clause was meant to proscribe state legal inequalities or
discriminations, but only those between some "person" and other
7 Id. at 1066-1076.
.s Id. at 1076.
597 Pet. 234 (1833).60 2 Crosskey 1080.
61 Id. at 1083.
62 Id. at 1083-1095. It is noteworthy that four Justices of the Supreme Court
-Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge-in their dissenting opinions in Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-125 (1947), subscribed to the view that the first
eight amendments were incorporated into the Fourteenth.63 See 2 Crosskey 1102-1116.
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"persons," for example, between a colored person and non-colored
persons; it was not intended to prohibit even the most arbitrary
discriminations between one class and other classes, for example,
between farmers and non-farmers. 64 Crosskey, therefore, has no
patience with the Supreme Court's opinions which have reduced
the Priviledges and Immunities Clause to a nullity, have sired the
illegitimate substantive due process concept and have relied upon
the Equal Protection Clause as a general roving commission to
review the reasonableness of every type of state law.
* * * a
By way of concluding our survey of Professor Crosskey's
unitary theory of the national government powers, let him speak
for himself:
The scheme of the Constitution is simple and flexible: gen-
eral national power, subject only to a few simple limitations,
with state powers, in the main, continuing for any desired
local legislation. So if the Constitution were allowed to
operate as the instrument was drawn, the American people
could, through Congress, deal with any subject they wished,
on a simple, straightforward, nationwide basis; and all
other subjects, they could, in general, leave to the states to
handle as the states might desire.
[U]nder the scheme of the Constitution, the laws of
Congress need not, any longer, be complicated and frag-
mentary in their incidence; the incessant jurisdictional litiga-
tion that now goes on, over the powers of the nation and
the powers of the states would be a thing of the past; and,
in general, all those expensive and paralyzing complexities
in our government . . . resulting from the Supreme Court's
theories, would be forever and completely at an end. And
with these things accomplished, the Court itself, as in the
early days, could, with great benefit to the American people,
devote itself undistractedly to its own truly intended func-
tion as the nation's juridical head. 5
IV. THE CRITCS AND CRossxiY-AN APPRAISAL
The scholars and practitioners who have reviewed Professor
Crosskey's two volumes have heeded the biblical admonition
about not being lukewarm-with very few exceptions they have
been very, very hot or very, very cold.
64 Id. at 1096-1102.
65 Id. at 1172-1178.
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Here are several samples of adverse criticism:
. . . [F]rankness requires admission of the impression that
such great labor has served for the most part only to bring
forth the proverbial mouse . . . On the whole . . . the
volumes are distinctly disappointing. R. K. Gooch, 40
A.B.A.J. 318, 314 (1954).
The work is what one might expect from a social scientist
who wants absolute government which could facilitate a
social revolution, but it is not what one would expect to be
the product of a scholarly legal mind. C. Perry Patterson,
32 Tex. L. Rev. 251, 255 (1953).
. . . Professor Crosskey has built on the strangest combina-
tion of fact and fancy ever put before the public . . . an
interpretation of the Constitution for which there is no
factual basis whatever. Worse than that, when facts get in
the way of fancy, Mr. Crosskey disposes of them either by
deft restatement, making them what they are not, or by
unwarranted accusations or insinuations, sometimes amount-
ing to character assassination . . . One would have to write
a fair-sized book to refute in detail all the distortions of
recorder fact and dispel the more numerous insinuations
relative to Madison alone. Irving Brant, 54 Col. L. Rev.
443, 445 (1954).
It is unfortunate that Mr. Crosskey's years of research
should have produced a book so incomplete in the evidence
it presents, so curious in its reasoning processes, so bitter
in its address to unwelcome ideas . . . E. J. Brown, 67
Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1456 (1954). 66
But Walton Hamilton has a rather unflattering answer for
Crosskey's critics:
The monograph boys and the pedants who conceive of
scholarship as an excursion in myopia will loudly voice dis-
approval. Then there are those who have, by the heroic
use of the pen, created for themselves vested interests in
established articles of constitutional faith. To them ac-
ceptance of the Crosskey thesis will be anathema. In par-
ticular, all those who expect dividends of prestige from
66 Other forthright rejections of Crosskey's work include: Fairman, 21 U.Chi.
L. Rev. 40 (1953); Goebel, 54 Col. L. Rev. 450 (1954); Hart, 67 Harv. L. Rev.
1456 (1954); Nevins, N. Y. Times Book Review, April 4, 1953, p. 7; Swisher,
The Saturday Review, April 4, 1953, pp. 33-34; and Wilmerding, 68 Pol. Sci. Q.
467 (1953). Three reviews have expressed discreet skepticism: McCloskey, 47
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 11 (1953); Ribble, 39 Va. L. Rev. 863 (1954); and Sutherland,
89 Cornell L. Q. 160 (1953).
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established scholarship will entrench themselves behind
their publications and defend their frontiers to the last
footnote. 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 79, 91 (1958).
As far as Hamilton is concerned:
Never has so adequate a gloss-fashioned from materials
from a hundred sources-been written to an authoritative
text. It is for this reason that Crosskey's volumes are timely,
that is, they are for all time. Id. at 92.
Other examples of favorable comment are:
Mr. Crosskey's evidence for his interpretation of the Con-
stitution is detailed, elaborate, internally consistent and in-
consistent with any other meaning . . . Though Crosskey's
position may have become unfamiliar, it seems to the re-
viewer impregnable. Malcolm Sharp, 54 Col. L. Rev. 489,
441, 443 (1954).
Professor Crosskey's new book on the Constitution is an
exciting work. It is exciting for a reason as unique as it is
admirable, the intellectual punch it delivers. . . . I cannot
believe but that devoted attempts such as this to ascertain
what was originally purposed and how results fell short of
objectives will play a large part in shaping our heavenly
city of the future. Charles E. Clark, 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
24, 39 (1958).
Professor Crosskey's study is a major work in the field of
American constitutional law and constitutional history,
judged by any standard . .. a piece of scholarship. Oliver
P. Field, 28 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1197 (1 9 53 ).7
It would seem to be unfortunate that for the most part scholars
in reviewing Professor Crosskey's work have adopted an either-
you're-for-him-or-you're-against-him approach and accordingly
have "chosen up sides." If there are any all-right-or-all-wrong
questions in the fields of law and history, the validity and sig-
nificance of Crosskey's theories and theses is clearly not one of
67 The following reviews have also praised Crosskey's work in whole or in
large part: Dean, 40 A.B.A.J. 314 (1954); Durham, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 209 (1953);
Forkosch, 20 Brooklyn L. Rev. 124 (1953); Heiman, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 138 (1953);
Jeffrey, 13 La. L. Rev. 638 (1953); Kelso, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 149 (1953); and
Peters, 28 Notre Dame Law. 308 (1953). A rather unique position concerning
Crosskey's work is taken by Howard Jay Graham. He writes: 'Is Politics and the
Constitution really a parable-a masterpiece of constitutional impressionism-a
mirror and a sermon in the form of a brief? ...Like the Sphinx and Congress,
Professor Crosskey speaks in riddles and shouts in silences." 7 Vand. L. Rev. 365
(1954).
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them. Of course, the odds against Crosskey's being 100% correct
are tremendous-it is just incredible that our nation has been vic-
timized by a plot to subvert the labors of the Founding Fathers
and that the Supreme Court and constitutional scholars have mis-
understood the real meaning of our basic legal document, at least
to the extent claimed by him. On the other hand, he is definitely
not a charlatan-his work is too thoroughly documented to permit
such a conclusion, and there is no evidence that he is not a man
of good will.
One of the most refreshing things about Crosskey's study is
his refusal to accept authority and mere repetition as the ultimate
criteria of historical truth. We are his debtors if for no other
reason than that he has dramatized the necessity of searching
patiently all relevant original documents and background his-
torical materials, not merely those that have been traditionally
relied upon. He has shown himself eminently prudent in return-
ing to the primary source material of American constitutional law.
True, Professor Crosskey's conclusions, standing by them-
selves, sound incredible and they are startling, if not shocking.
Yet the evidence he advances to support them is impressive, not
only because of its sheer mass-because it is elaborate and detailed
-but also because of the resourcefuillness with which it has been
discovered and the skill with which it has been marshalled. An
original thinker and master logician, he lucidly presents his new
and fascinating theories with verve and biting sarcasm. What
has resulted is a plausible, powerful opening statement of his
position, and at the very least he should not be non-suited.
It is rather unfortunate, though, that in proposing his views
Crosskey has become so emotionally involved and personally
committed. He does not always give the impression of a detached
scholar at work, for he finds it difficult to advance his arguments
dispassionately, and his writing often takes on the style of a
lawyer's brief. His condemnations of legal and historical scholar-
ship are needlessly tactless, and it is not impossible to understand
how his attitude could be interpreted as a belligerent, chip-on-
the-shoulder one. He appears to enjoy his "debunking" just a
little too much. Then, too, Crosskey employs a "no-possible-
doubt" phraseology that can become irksome. Finally, it is ques-
tionable whether his disparaging characterizations of Jefferson,
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Madison, Mason and Taney are in good taste. However, all this
has its good side. You always know where Crosskey stands; there
are no unexpressed premises, no straddling of issues, no double
talk. He seems to say exactly what he means, and there is every
reason to think that he means and firmly believes exactly what he
says.
Crosskey and his followers emphasize the consistency of his
unitary theory of the national governing powers. But a reader
cannot help but get the feeling that the meaning of Crosskey's
Constitution is too crystal-clear, that his constitutional universe
is too perfect. Nor can one help but be a little suspicious that
perhaps Crosskey has omitted unpleasant facts that could not
be reconciled with his theses. Professor Charles Fairman, "a legal
historian of notable fairness,"6 claims that Crosskey in his treat-
ment of Barron v. Baltimore selected material favorable to his
position, but neglected abundant evidence to the contrary.6
Professor Julius Goebel, speaking on behalf of Clio, contends that
Crosskey has not mastered the details of legal development in
the colonies and the states; he challenges on historical grounds-
Crosskey's view that the colonies had a common customary law-
and that the Founding Fathers intended to convert this common
customary law into a general common law for the United States.7°'
And in passing, it may be observed that Crosskey's treatment of
the "Third American Constitution" is in general less exhaustive,
searching and brilliant than his study of the original Constitution
and the Bill of Rights.7
Crosskey and his followers stress that the Constitution, as he
has rediscovered it, is eminently suited to meet the needs of our
Nation today. But what about the United States of 1787? When
one remembers that about ninety per cent of the population was
agricultural, that roads were bad, that certain sections were in
large part isolated from the rest of the country, it would seem
clear that at the time the Constitution was drafted the United
08 Sutherland, 39 Cornell L. Rev. 160, 169 (1953).
69 See Fairman, "The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Limitations on
State Governmental Autholity ," 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 40 (1953). For Crosskey's
reply, see Charles Fairman, "Legislative History, and the Constitutional Limita-
tions on State Authority," 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1954). For Fairman's replication,.
see "A Reply to Professor Crosskey," 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 144 (1954).
70 See Goebel, 'Ex Parte Clio," 54 Col. L. Rev. 450 (1954).
71 See Frank, 49 N.W. U.L. Rev. 132 (1954).
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States was not well-suited for a unitary governmental structure
and system. Crosskey may be technically correct concerning his
philological arguments, but certainly some of those who spoke
eighteenth century English would have been surprised to learn
that the Constitution vested general powers in a highly central-
ized national government.
The most unfortunate thing about Crosskey's study, however,
is that it is incomplete. He has yet to present in any great detail
his analyses of what happened at the Constitutional Convention,
what was said and done during the Ratification Campaign, and
why the intended scheme of government was never put into
operation. This he plans to do in forthcoming volumes. It can be
hoped that he will also attempt to explain more explicitly the
relatively rapid shift from the Constitutional advocacy of a strong
central government in 1787 to the Jeffersonian championing of
states' rights by 1801. In this connection, Crosskey's colleague,
Professor Max Rheinstein says that the promised volumes will
show the decisive role played in the falsification of the historical
picture by James Madison.72
Obviously, it would be premature to come to a final conclusion
at this time on the question whether the words of the Constitution
meant in 1787 what Professor Crosskey says they did. But this
is so not just because his study is incomplete. Before a fair and
impartial judgment can be rendered with respect to even the two
volumes which have appeared, it will be necessary for scholars
to go over Crosskey's source materials with a fine-tooth comb.
Only after his steps have been carefully retraced, can his argu-
ments be critically evaluated and his constitutional interpreta-
tions be seen in their proper perspective. This will take many
years and dozens of doctoral theses. One thing, however, seems
certain: Crosskey's study is a stimulating, provocative, challenging
intellectual achievement which has already made its impact felt
in educational circles and one which will leave its marks on
scholarly endeavors for years to come.
Whether Professor Crosskey's theories will have an effect upon
our legal system and our governmental structure, whether that
effect, if any, will be profound and lasting, only time can tell.
72 Rheinstein, "Crosskey on 'Politics and the Constitution'," U. of Chi. Law
School Record, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 14 (1954).
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Surely some of the Supreme Court Justices will read Crosskey,
and perhaps the law clerks of the others will do so, too. At least
some of his arguments will eventually be presented to the Court
and passed upon. His influence is also likely to be felt in Con-
gress; indeed it is to that body that he has dedicated his entire
work "in the hope that it may be led to claim and exercise for the
common good of the country the powers justly belonging to it
under the Constitution." But it is submitted that in the last
analysis the extent of Crosskey's influence will be determined prin-
cipally by the extent to which his underlying philosophy of con-
stitutional law is accepted and acted upon by our formal authori-
tative decision-makers.
V. CONCLUSION-A NEW SCHOOL OF CONsTrt oNAL LAW
There are several basic questions that are implicitly raised by
Professor Crosskey's methodological approach: What essentially
and realistically is a constitution? Whence the binding force of
our nation's constitutive legal document? Is there a fundamental
difference between the American written Constitution and the
English unwritten one? Does the United States actually have a
written Constitution? What precisely are or should be the reasons
for constitutional development and change? Is it really important
to discover the "true" 1787 meaning of the Constitution?
It would seem that the most significant aspect of Professor
Crosskey's study is that he has in effect established a new school
of constitutional law. His entire work is a forthright rejection
of the constitutional doctrines of the conservative historical school,
and he has no patience with, or respect for, what he describes as
"the 'liberalizing' sophistries of the 'living document' school."7 3
One way of classifying the new Crosskey school, however, would
be as a hybrid of the conservative historical school and the living
document school. From the viewpoint of methodology and form,
the Crosskey school resembles the former; from the viewpoint of
content and doctrine, it approximates the latter. Similarly to the
conservative historical school, Professor Crosskey is an ardent
advocate of a written constitution with precise, definite meanings,
and he insists on the importance of discovering the meaning of
73 2 Crosskey 1172.
KENTUcKY LAW JouRNAL
the Constitution as it was originally written. But Crosskey reaches
many of the actual and potential conclusions of the living docu-
ment school. Of course, Crosskey's followers would be quick to
point out that unlike that of the conservative historical school, his
methodological approach is a scientific one which enables him to
arrive at the "true" meaning of the original Constitution; and that
unlike the living document school, he need not resort to the em-
barrassing intellectual task of squeezing, stretching and distorting
the Constitution, nor is his end product an artificial patchwork
of doctrinal interpretations. In short, it appears to be the con-
tention of the Crosskey school that the Constitution means today
what it did in the summer of 1787 when "Go. Washington-Presi-
dent and deputy from Virginia" became its first signer, and that
it meant then what Crosskey's historico-philological lexicon says
it did.
Crosskey's opponents have a perfect opening at this point.
They can remark sarcastically that the Nation is being asked to
accept the proposition that the Constitution is not what the
Supreme Court says it is, but rather what Crosskey says it is and
that the credo of the Crosskeyites is that there is no law but the
Constitution and Crosskey is its prophet.
As has been mentioned in another context, the Crosskey Con-
stitution is compatible with the present political economy of the
United States and is ideally suited to meet what many would
consider to be the needs of our times. Admitting this to be the
case, we have already asked from an historical viewpoint: what
about the United States of 1787? Another relevant question is:
what about 1987? In proposing his kind of written constitution
rather than a living one, is Crosskey not underestimating the
advantages of subtle changes that can emerge only through
statesman-like judicial interpretation, based upon political custom
and tradition?74 Does he not fail to realize that the Constitution
has served our Nation as well as it has in large part because of
the ambiguity and indefiniteness of many of its provisions; that
with changing economic, social and political conditions, constitu-
tional provisions will be and should be given new and expanded
or contracted meanings; that "We, the People" were not merely
the citizens of the eighteenth century, but are also the citizens
74See Lasswell, 22 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 383-86 (1954).
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of each succeeding generation? These are questions of the great-
est importance, for, as Mr. justice Douglas has so well expressed
it: "The Constitution was written for all times and all ages. It
would lose its great character and become feeble if it were allowed
to become encrusted with narrow legalistic notions that domi-
nated the thinking of one generation." 75 In fairness to Professor
Crosskey, however, it should be remembered that under his Con-
stitution, Congress would possess general legislative authority,
and the Supreme Court would not be endowed with the power
of general judicial review. Thus new social and economic prob-
lems and political challenges could be met by the legislative
enactments of Congress, a governmental branch that is directly
responsible to the people at the polls and accordingly more re-
sponsive to the will of the majority.
A final consideration: assume arguendo that Crosskey is 100%
correct concerning his philological and historical conclusions;
what then? Should we return to pristine constitutional purity by
revamping our governmental structure according to the 1787
meaning of the Constitution? Should historic facts about the
perspectives of the Founding Fathers be binding upon the au-
thoritative decision-makers of today to the extent that our present
constitutional form of government should be drastically modified
just because historic and philological mistakes were made in the
past? Even if Crosskey should be correct in his thesis that the
Supreme Court was not intended to possess the power of general
judicial review, there are many who would be unalterably op-
possed to doing anything about it. Under Crosskey's Constitu-
tion, Congress could abridge the freedoms of religion, speech,
press and assembly, in fact, any of the constitutional safeguards
other than those pertaining to the administration of justice; the
only recourse available to the citizenry would be the ballot box.
There would be no adequate means for the protection of the
rights of minorities, and this would constitute a major setback to
the progressive development of democracy under the aegis of the
rule of law. Pristine constitutional orthodoxy cannot be worth
that muchl
However, should Crosskey be philologically and historically
75 Douglas, "The Dissent: A Safeguard for Democracy," J. Am. Jud. Sc.
104, 106 (1948).
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correct to any great extent, it is imperative that we critically re-
evaluate the essential nature of the constitutional decision-making
process of the Supreme Court. If we are to be intellectually
honest with ourselves and to maintain the integrity of our legal
system, it will be necessary at the very least to replace the tradi-
tional mythical rationalizations for many of our constitutional
doctrines with realistic, rational justifications. Further, should
Crosskey be philologically and historically correct to any great
extent, we as a Nation shall be faced with momentous and far-
reaching decisions concerning alternative governmental policies
and practices which possess what we have traditionally regarded
as the hallmark of constitutional orthodoxy-the approbation of
the Founding Fathers as expressed in our basic legal document.
Whether or not we shall consider it wise or expedient to return
at this late date in whole or in part to eighteenth century constitu-
tional orthodoxy, who would deny that William Winslow Cross-
key deserves well of his fellow citizens for having attempted to
give us this choice?
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